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Neutral Propaganda: Three Films "Made
in Canada" and the Foreign Agents
Registration Act
by ANNE DORFMAN*
I
Introduction
In 1934, the United States House of Representatives formed
the House Un-American Activities Committee ("HUAC")' to
investigate the problem of mass dissemination of "Nazi... and
certain other subversive propaganda" distributed in the United
States.2 Much of this material, which exhorted Americans to
support Nazi or Communist causes, was produced outside the
United States but, by not identifying its foreign source, was
designed to give the impression that it originated in this
country.3
HUAC's efforts resulted in passage of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938 ("FARA" or "the Act").4 The primary
stated purpose of the Act was "to require the registration of
certain persons employed by agencies to disseminate propa-
ganda in the United States."5 Section 4 of the Acte requires the
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. That committee, chaired by Rep. McCormack, was also known as the McCor-
mack Committee. See generally T. TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST (1955).
2. H.L Res. 424, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 11,069 (1934); see also H.R.
Re. 198, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. Ec. 13 (1934). Vast quantities of pro-Nazi and
pro.Communist materials were distributed throughout the country. Schwartz &
Paul, Foreign Communist Propaganda in the Mail" A Report on Some Problems of
Federal Censorship, 107 U. PA. L REv. 621, 624-25 (1959).
3. Note, Government Exclusion qf Foreign Political Propaganda, 69 HARV. I.
REv. 1393, 1396 (1955). Just as Tokyo Rose wanted her listeners to believe that she
acted in the interests of the United States during World War I, or as "dirty tricks"
operations may involve planting incriminating materials identified as originating with
a particular group to discredit them, this material was designed to manipulate its re-
ceivers by obscuring its origin. See D. MASON, WHO's WHO IN WORLD WAR II 327-28
(1978); C. BERNSrEm & B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PRWDENT's MEN 112-0 (1974).
4. Act of June 8, 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (1938) [hereinafter cited as 1938 Act].
The Act is also known as the McCormack Act. See H.R. REP. No. 153, 74th Cong., ist
Sees. 23 (1935). The current version of FARA is found at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1983).
5. Pub. L. No. 75-883, 52 Stat. 631 (1938). The statement of purpose indicated
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labeling of all "political propaganda," defined in section 1(j) to
include:
any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or other communi-
cation or expression ... which is reasonably adapted to, or
which the person disseminating the same believes will, or
which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, in-
duce, or in any other way influence a recipient or any section
of the public within the United States with reference to the
political or public interests, policies, or relations of a govern-
ment of a foreign country or a foreign political party or with
reference to the foreign policies of the United States or pro-
mote in the United States racial, religious, or social
dissensions. 7
Section 48 also requires persons registered under the Act'
who distribute films in this country to file "dissemination re-
ports '1 ° listing to whom the films are distributed, the dates on
which they are shown and an estimated record of attendance at
each showing." These reports are available to the public.'2
In January 1983, the United States Department of Justice in-
formed the National Film Board of Canada ("NFBC" or "the
Film Board") that three of its documentary films 13 had been
that the Act was also to be used "for other purposes." See infra notes 28-31 and ac-
companying text.
6. 22 U.S.C. § 614 (1982).
7. 22 U.S.C. § 611(J)(1) (1982). Section 1(j)(2) defines political propaganda as any
communication v"which advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social,
political, or religious disorder, civil riot or other conflict involving the use of force or
violence in any other American republic or the overthrow of any government or polit-
ical subdivision of any other American republic by any means involving the use of
force or violence." (emphasis added).
8. 22 U.S.C. § 614(a) (1982).
9. See infra note 47.
10. See 28 C.F.R. § 5.401 (1983).
11. FARA is enforced under 28 CY.F §§ 5.1-5.801 (1983). See 32 C.F.R. 6362,
Apr. 22, 1967; 46 C.F.R 52355, Oct. 27, 1981.
Section 5.401 requires that the names and addresses of "any station, organization or
theater" exhibiting a propaganda film be disclosed on Form OBD-69. These § 4 re-
quirements bear no easily discernible relationship to the government's stated purpose
of informing viewers about the source of the materials they see. They are possibly
related to the government's alleged national security interest in monitoring propa-
ganda, which the Department of Justice claims counterbalances any encroachment by
FARA on the first amendment rights of film producers, exhibitors and viewer. See
ifra notes 143-153 and accompanying text and note 85.
12. 22 U.S.C. § 616 (1982); 28 C.F.R § 5.600 (1983).
13. The films, which range in impact from innocuous to powerful, are documenta-
ries about environmental pollution and potential nuclear holocaust. ,f You Love This
Planet was awarded an Academy Award as Best Short Documentary of 1982. Wash-
ington Post columnist Mary McGrory said of Acid Raft Requiem or Recovery that
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designated "political propaganda" under section 1(j) of FARA
and must be so labeled before being distributed in the United
States.1 ' These films examine important public policy issues of
concern to both United States and Canadian citizens. Two of
the films, Acid Rain" Requiem or Recovery and Acid From
Heaven, look at the effects of the contamination of rain water
by airborne pollutants.1 5 If You Love This Planet discusses the
probable effects of nuclear war.16 The constitutionality of
FARA's application to these films is the subject of pending
litigation.1 7
"[a] more tactful, neutral, inoffensive presentation of a fearful problem that is being
visited on one country (theirs) by another country (ours) cannot be imagined." Mc-
Grory, Justice Department's Boos Make Film Sutbjet Boffo Boa Office, Wash. Post,
Mar. 1, 1983, at A3, col. a.
14. Each year about half of the approximately 25 films reviewed by theJustice
Department are found to be "propaganda." Wash. Post, Feb. 27,1983, at B6, col. a. 22
U.S.C. § 614(b) requires that any political propaganda distributed by a registered for-
eign agent be so labeled. The label must indicate the relationship between the infor-
mation and the person transmitting it, that the supplier is a foreign agent, that
information about the agent's registration is publicly available, and that the registra-
tion of the foreign agent does not mean that the contents of materials distributed by
the agent have been approved by the government. The word "propaganda" need not
appear on the labeL The wording suggested by the Department of Justice is.
This material Is prepared, edited, issued or circulated by [name and address
of registrant], which is registered with the Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, D.C., under the Foreign Agents Registration Act as an agent of [name
and address of foreign principal]. Dissemination reports on this film are filed
with the Department of Justice where the required registration statement is
available for public inspection. Registration does not indicate approval of the
contents of this material by the United States.
See DeCair, Justice is Not Censoring Films, Wash. Post, Mar. 6,1983 at C7, col. 2. The
government claims that the labels may be removed with impunity before the films are
shown to the public. This claim, however, is not supported by the language of the Act
or by its implementing regulations. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-618 (1982); 28 C.F.R §§ 5.400-
402 (1983). Furthermore, this argument is logically inconsistent with the govern-
ment's justification for FARA. The statute's failure to require a permanent label
would undermine its alleged purpose of informing the public about the source of com-
munications. The claim that the label a distributor is required to attach to a film may
be removed before the film is shown by a person receiving the film from a distributor
seems to have been made to challenge the standing of plaintiffs suing the government
for its application of the Act to the Canadian films; it does not appear to fit the design
of FARA. See Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513, 1519 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 1983). The gov-
ernment also fails to consider the prohibitive expense of removing the film labels.
15. As of November 1985, the United States and Canada have not been able to
negotiate a treaty aimed at controlling acid rain. See Oakes, Acid Rain's Political
Poison, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1985, at 17, col. 2.
16. The film includes a scene from Jap Zero, a "B" movie of the 1940's starring
Ronald Reagan as an eager "Jap hunting" aviator who asks, "How soon do I get a
chance to knock one of them down?" McGrory, supra note 13.
17. See itflu, Addendum.
No. 3]
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This note assesses the legislative intent behind FARA by ex-
amining the statute's legislative background and the history of
its enforcement in light of the usual meaning of the word
"propaganda." It then questions whether sections 1(j) and 418
may constitutionally be applied to the Canadian films, rejecting
the government's argument that the word "propaganda" is
facially neutral when used in a self-defining statute such as
FARA.19 The note concludes that because no compelling state
interest justifies the "political propaganda" designation, appli-
cation of FARA unconstitutionally inhibits the first amend-
ment rights of the films' distributors, exhibitors and viewers. It
also concludes that section 1(j) is vague and overbroad, and that
categorization of the Canadian films as political propaganda on
the basis of such a vague statute, absent any procedural safe-
guards, violates the first2° and fifth21 amendments of the
United States Constitution.
II
FARA's History
We believe that the spotlight of pitiless publicity will serve as a
deterrent to the spread of pernicious propaganda?
A. Legislative History
The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 was a criminal
18. If particular materials are political propaganda under § 1, they must be so la-
beled under § 4; therefore, the two sections of FARA are inextricable." Keene, 569 F.
Supp. at 1523. This note focuses on the questionable constitutionality of § 1. An anal-
ysis of § 4, while integrally related, is beyond the scope of this note. Application of
FARA to the three Canadian films also raises issues of censorship and chilling effect,
prior restraint, the validity of the allegedly compelling national security interests ad-
vanced by the government, and the right to receive and to distribute information un-
burdened. These issues, of independent significance, are only touched upon here.
19. 1Propaganda" is a broad term that is usually pejorative. See infro, text accom-
panying notes 103-111. In general, it refers to use of mass communications media in-
tended to fool an unsuspecting public. See L. MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA,
ITS LEGAL AND DIPwMATIC CONTROL 3-54 (1958) for a discussion of the methods of
international political propagandists. The government claims, however, that using
the word to describe communications does not necessarily have a negative impact on
how those materials are received. See infra, text accompanying notes 112-123.
20. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S.
CONsr. amend. .
21. The fifth amendment requires fundamental fairness by guaranteeing that no
person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
U.& CONST. amend. V.
22. H.R REP. No. 1381, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), 83 CONG. REc. 8,021-M (1938).
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registration statutes designed to protect the American public
from the influence of Nazi and Communist materials.24 It re-
quired that all "agents ' '2 of foreign interests ("foreign princi-
pals")2e operating in the United States register with the
Secretary of State.' Although contemporary House and Sen-
ate committee reports indicate that monitoring subversive ac-
tivity was unquestionably the focus of the legislationi the
word "subversive" did not appear in the final version of the
Act. Further, the legislative history does not indicate why the
statute did not refer to "subversion" directly. It is likely that
Congress wished not only to deal with "subversive"' ' communi-
cations-those advocating overthrow of the United States gov-
ernment-but also to regulate a broader range of informations °
As a 1938 Senate Report discussing the propaganda menace
stated: "[FARA's registration requirement will permit] the
American people [to] know those who are engaged in this coun-
23. Violation of the 1938 statute was punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and/or
two years in prison. 1938 Act § 618. The current statute prescribes a fine of up to
$10,000 and/or five years in prison. 22 U.S.C. § 618 (1982).
24. Schwartz & Paul, supra note 2, at 624-25.
25. In the 1938 statute, an "agent" was broadly defined to include a person acting
as "public-relations counsel, or as agent, servant, representative, or attorney for a for-
eign principal or... domestic organization subsidized... by a foreign principal."
1938 Act § 611. The word "propaganda" was not defined. The term "agent" was rede-
fined in 1966. See ftfra notes 42 and 45.
26. A "foreign principal" was defined as "the government of a foreign country, a
political party of a foreign country, a person domiciled abroad, or any foreign busi-
ness, partnership, association, corporation, or political organization." 1938 Act § 611.
The definition covered "practically everyone from an impersonal government to an
individual who was not located in the United States." Schwartz & Paul, supra note 2,
at 625. The term "foreign principal" was redefined in 1966. See infra notes 42 and 45.
27. Enforcement of the Act was transferred to the Attorney General in 1942.
Exec. Order No. 9176, 7 Fed. Reg. 4,127 (1942).
28. U. S. Congressional representatives spoke of the need to monitor "subversive
activities by the nationals of foreign governments," "propaganda agents," and "secret
spies" who "work to strike at the very things we cherish and which are the very fun-
damentals of our government," See 79 CONG. REc. 2,668 (1935) (statement of Rep.
Dickstein); ILR. REP. No. 423, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 11,069 (1944). See
also, HIR Res. 198, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. Rnc. 13 (1944).
29. Registration of propagandists who advocate overthrow of the United States
government is specifically covered in 18 U.S.C. § 2386 (1983) (originally enacted as Act
of October 17,1940,54 Stat. 1201). Under the current § 1(j), FARA applies to informa-
tion falling into three broad categorles. that which influences United States citizens
with reference to foreign political interests; that which influences citizens with refer-
ence to United States foreign policy, and that which promotes violent "racial, social,
political or religious disorder... in any other American republic." 22 U.aC. § 611(j)
(1982) (emphasis added). See supra note 6. Thus, by definition, FARA does not at-
tempt to monitor domestic subversion.
80. See supra note 5.
No. 3]
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try by foreign agencies to spread doctrines alien to our demo-
cratic form of government or propaganda for the purpose cf
influencing American public opinion on a political
question.8 1
In 1942, FARA was amended substantially in an attempt to
facilitate more effective enforcement of its provisions.32 Few
foreign agents had registered, and few who failed to register
had been prosecuted.33 The additions to the Act were meant to
include within their purview only those activities specifically
regulated under the original Act.'
As originally enacted and as codified in the 1942 amend-
ments, FARA applied only to purveyors of propaganda "[act-
ing] within the United States who [are agents] of a foreign
principal and [who are] required to register."' 5 Thus, through
its incorporation of the 1942 amendments, the current Act does
not cover persons outside this country who send political propa-
ganda materials into the United States.6
31. S. REP. No. 1783, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938) (emphasis added). An identical
statement is found in H.R. REP. No. 1381, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
32. The amendments reflected the perceived need "to continue . . . investigation
of subversive activities." 87 CONG. REC. 10,048 (1941); 88 CONG. REC. 802 (1942).
33. Note, supra note 3, at 1397; Schwartz & Paul, supra note 2, at 625-26.
34. Congress made a "[p]articular effort. . . to insure that none of these [new]
definitions could be so interpreted as to include within their compass ... activities
which the Congress did not intend to regulate under its original enactment." H.P.
REP. No. 1547, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1941). The Act's 1942 introductory statement
explained that FARA was intended.
to protect the national defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the
United States by requiring public disclosure by persons engaging in propa-
ganda activities and other activities ... for or on behalf of... foreign prin-
cipals so that the Government and the people of the United States may...
appraise their statements and actions in the light of their associations and
activities.
Pub. L. No. 532, 56 Stat. 248-49 (1942). 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (emphasis added).
35. Act of April 29, 1942, ch. 263 § 1, Pub. L No. 532, 56 Stat. 248 (1942) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1942 FARA]. The relevant current section appears at 22 U.S.C. § 614(a)
(1982).
36. This omission left a large loophole, and to date no United States statute has
been designed to regulate communications by foreign-based propagandists. See
Schwartz & Paul, supra note 2, at 626. Thus, materials that actually are subversive
will not be labeled under FARA if distributed by non-"agents" or from outside the
United States, while non-subversive materials distributed by "agents" within United
States borders must be labeled. See Note, supra note 3, at 1398 for a discussion of what
it means to "act within the United States." In addition, agents of foreign principals
who are diplomats, their staffs and officials of foreign governments are exempt from
registration, as are persons engaged in purely commercial foreign trade, religious, aca-
demic, scientific and fine arts pursuits. Attorneys representing foreign principals in
the United States are exempt insofar as that representation does not include attempts
[Vol. 7
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
The 1942 amendments continued to avoid use of the word
"subversive."' "Political propaganda," undefined in the 1938
Act, was defined broadly in section l(j).1 Section 4, requiring
that all propaganda be labeled and that the names of its recipi-
ents be reported to the Justice Department, was added-' It is
likely that Congress' wartime inclusion of a broad definition of
"propaganda" represented a compromise with those legislators
who would have liked a statute explicitly applicable to "subver-
sives" and "enemy agents."' 4 It is also possible that the broad
definition was perceived as permitting FARA's future applica-
tion to a wider range of materials viewed as threatening demo-
cratic philosophy and traditions."
FARA was amended again in 1966,4 shifting the focus of the
Act:
The original target of foreign agent legislation-the subversive
agent and propagandist of pre-World War II days--has been
covered by subsequent legislation, notably the Smith Act. The
place of the old foreign agent has been taken by the lawyer-
lobbyist and public relations counsel whose purpose is not to
subvert or overthrow the U.S. Government, but to influence its
policies to the satisfaction of his particular client.'
Congress made clear its intention that the amended Act should
apply to "agents" acting "for or in the interests of foreign prin-
cipals" whose activities are "political in nature or border on the
political. '"" Significantly, Congress did not amend the 1942 sec-
to influence or persuade United States agency personnel or officials "other than in the
course of established agency proceedings." 22 U.S.C. § 613 (1982). U.S. Journalists and
news organizations are not "agents." 22 U.S.C. § 611(d) (1982).
37. Although approved by the House, a proposal to make express reference to
"enemy agents" was excised in conference. See 87 CONG. REC. 10,051, 10,054, 10,056
(1941); 88 CONG. REC. 797406 (1942).
38. Congressional concern over subversive activities was strong in 1938 due to the
deteriorating political situation in Europe and the large amount of propaganda enter-
ing the United States. Talk of the dangers of propaganda was common in Congress.
See Schwartz & Paul, supra note 2, at 624-25.
39. 1942 FARA § 614.
40. See supra note 37.
41. The Justification given for the broad definition was that it was not to be used
in determining who was required to register as a foreign agent, but only in labeling
communications sent by those required to register. S. REP. No. 913, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1941); HR REP. No. 1547, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 4-5 (1941); Note, 8upra note
3, at 1400.
42. Pub. L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 244 (1966). The extent to which FARA's focus
shifted in 1966 remains unclear due to Congress' retention of the word "propaganda"
in § 1(J). See infr text accompaying notes 45 and 46.
4& S. REP. No. 143, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965).
44. LE REP. No. 1470, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 2, ,printed in 1966 US. CODE CONG.
No. 3]
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tion 1(j) definition of "propaganda." Nor did Congress change
section 4 in any way relevant to the Act's constitutionality.'
Given the substantial changes enacted in 1966, it appears that
Congress' retention of the definition determining the breadth
of the entire Act was deliberate.48
B. Application To Domestic Materials
Citizens and non-citizens who "transmit" propaganda within
the United States are required to register if they are working
under the direction of a foreign government or political party;' 7
nowhere does the statute indicate that it applies solely to for-
eign-produced materials.48 Any political material, whether pro-
duced here or abroad, is subject to the section 4 disclosure
requirements if transmitted by a person who must register
under section 2.49 This dual application has caused much confu-
sion, as all judges who have interpreted FARA have viewed the
Act as applicable only to materials produced abroad.50 It is
& AD. NEWS 2,397-2417. The term "[bordering] on the political" was used by House
members to describe communications "carried on in peculiarly sensitive areas in
which the line between political and nonpolitical action is difficult to define." Id. at
2,400. This statement should be read in the context of Congress' decision to reframe
FARA's purpose so as to encompass the activities of 'lawyer-lobbyists" rather than of
"secret agents." See supra text accompanying note 43.
45. The terms "agent of foreign principal," "public-relations counsel," "political
activities" and "political consultant" were changed. H.R REP. No. 1470, 89th Cong. 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CONG. AND AD. NEws 2,397, 2,400-02.
46. See C. SANDS, STATuTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION §§ 2230,49.10 (1973).
47. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 611(c): "[An] agent... is any person who acts... at the
order, request, or under the control, of a foreign principal... within the United
States... in the interests of [a] foreign government or political party." (emphasis
added). For example, former-President Jimmy Carter's brother Billy was forced to
register as an agent of Libya. See also Attorney General v. Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d
928, 945 n.90 (1982) (New York based newspaper required to register). See Note,
supra note 3, at 1398 for a discussion of FARA's registration requirements as they
affect persons outside the United States.
48. Read correctly, the statute says that any political materials used by any per-
son who must register under FARA may be deemed to be political propaganda. Sec-
tion 1(j)(1) refers to "any ... communication... by any person ... which... will
... influence a recipient... within the United States with reference to the political
or public interests ... of a government of a foreign country ... or... to the foreign
policies of the United States." 22 U.S.C. § 611(J)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). Section 4
mandates labeling "any political propaganda." 22 U.S.C. § 614(a) (1982) (emphasis ad-
ded). In defining an "agent of a foreign principal" as any person who acts "within the
United States" "under the direction" and "in the interests of" a foreign government
or political party, § 1(c) in no way indicates that such agents must use only foreign
produced materials in their efforts to influence U.S citizens. 22 U..C. § 611(c) (1982).
49. See supra notes 47 and 48.
50. See Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513, 1520 (ED. Cal. 1983); Block v. Smith,
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most likely, though, that materials like the three Canadian
films, 51 both foreign-produced and distributed by a foreign
agent, would be caught in the FARA net. Because they must
regularly deal with the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Bureau of Customs
in the course of conducting their business here, foreign produ-
cers are more apt to be subjected to FARA's registration re-
quirements than are domestic producers.
Courts have upheld the federal government's right to regu-
late under FARA as grounded in its inherent power to conduct
foreign relations.- Nevertheless, the first amendment protects
our right to receive untrammelled speech from abroad.' Even
if FARA applied only to speech of foreign origin, those commu-
nications could not be burdened absent a compelling state in-
terest.5 4  For first amendment purposes, information is
information; its origin is irrelevant.'
III
FARA's Enforcement
A. Enforcement History
FARA's registration requirements have been upheld on the
ground that the Act protects national security interests.5 How-
583 F. Supp. 1288 (D.D.C. 1984). See also Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251
(Black, J., dissenting).
51. See supr,, text accompanying notes 13-16.
52. Attorney General v. Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1982); At-
torney General v. Irish Northern Aid Comm., 346 F. Supp. 1384,1390 (S.D.N.Y.), offd,
465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1080 (1972); United States v. Peace Infor-
mation Center, 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951).
53. See infra note 85; Kleindlenst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (right to
read foreign material), citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.. 557, 564 (1969) (right to receive information is protected);
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (right to ideas is important
right); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (right to receive information is fundamental).
54. See L. TRUW, AMERICAN CONSTITTMONAL LAW § 12-8 (1978); see also infr
note 85.
55. See, ag., Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408 US. at 762-63. This argument was sug-
gested by John G. Donhoff, attorney for Barry Keene, in a telephone interview (Oct.
l. 1984).
56. See, ag, Attorney General v. Irish People, Inc., 684 F2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 182)
(registration requirement does not burden speech); Attorney General v. Irish North-
ern Aid Comm., 530 F. Supp. 241,253 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), or'd, 668 FM2d 159 (2d Cir. 1982);
Attorney General v. Irish Northern Aid Comm., 346 F. Supp. 1384,1390-91 (S.D.N.Y.),
qt'd, 465 FM2l 1405 (2d Cir.), cert denie 409 U.S. 1080 (1972) (upholding compeled
reporting of contributors to registered foreign agents); United States v. Peace Infor-
No. 3]
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ever, neither the Act's disclosure requirements nor the section
10) definition of "propaganda" has been judicially tested.
In 1943, the Act's registration requirement was challenged
unsuccessfully in Viereck v. United States.57 The Viereck
Court stated that FARA's purpose is "to identify agents of for-
eign principals who might engage in subversive acts or in
spreading foreign propaganda."' Justice Black, with whom
Justice Douglas joined, stated his belief that FARA's require-
ments do not chill first amendment rights. The Act, he said,
[r]ests on the fundamental constitutional principle that our
people, adequately informed, may be trusted to distinguish be-
tween the true and the false, [and that] this bill is intended to
label information of foreign origin so that hearers and readers
may not be deceived by the belief that the information comes
from a disinterested source. Such legislation implements
rather than detracts from the prized freedoms guaranteed in
the First Amendment."9
During the 1950's and early 1960's, the United States Post Of-
fice borrowed FARA's expansive definition of "political propa-
ganda" to justify its confiscation of huge amounts of foreign
mail under the Espionage Act of 1917.° Using section 1(j) as a
guideline, all mail from Communist countries was routed to a
mation Center, 97 F. Supp. 255,263-64 (D.D.C. 1951) (federal government has power to
prohibit Interference with foreign affairs); United States v. Auhagen, 39 F. Supp. 590,
591 (D.D.C. 1941) (registration requirement not intended to deprive citizens of access
to information); Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 243-45 (1943) (agent not re-
quired to disclose propaganda activities conducted on own behalf rather than as agent
of German government). The government's pattern of enforcing other FARA provi-
sions raises some questions similar to those reached under the equal protection clause
that are beyond the scope of this note. For a recent and thorough review of FARA's
legislative and enforcement history, see Attorney General v. Irish People, Inc., 684
F.2d at 937-45.
57. 318 U.S. 236 (1943).
58. Id. at 241.
59. Id. at 251 (Black, J., dissenting on other grounds). The government relies on
this forty-year-old statement to support its claim that application of FARA to the
Canadian films promotes free and open debate. Defendants' Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction and in Support of
Motion to Dismiss at 19, Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513 (E.D. Cal. 1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Keene Defendants' Memo]. It is questionable whether this argument
would be advanced today. Furthermore, it is not on point in the current challenge
because Viereck did not address the issues of labeling and reporting. See aupra text
accompanying notes 56 and 57. See also L. TRIBE, upra note 54 at §§ 12-8, 12-13; see
ifra note 87.
60. See Schwartz & Paul, supra note 2, and Note, supra note 3 for a thorough
discussion of cold war era exclusion of pro-Communist materials by the United States
Post Office.
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regional screening office. If Customs authorities determined a
piece of mail to be "Communist political propaganda," the mail
was held and the addressee notified. Before the mail could be
delivered, the addressee was required to fill out a postcard indi-
cating whether he or she wished to receive the material and/or
any similar "Communist political propaganda" in the future.61
In 1965, this policy was declared unconstitutional in Lamont v.
Postmaster General.a The Lamont Court, however, did not
reach the issue of section 1(j)'s constitutionality. The Court in-
validated the Post Office policy on first amendment grounds,
finding that requiring addressees to inform postal authorities
that they wished to receive impounded mail unjustifiably tim-
ited their freedom of speech63
B. The Current Challenge
The New York office of the NFBC has been a registered
agent of the National Film Board of Canada, Ottawa, Canada
since 1947. The Film Board distributes films and videotapes
in the United States for "artistic and commercial purposes."'
As a registered agent, the NFBC periodically submits to the
Department of Justice a list of the film titles it distributes in
the United States."
Between January 1 and June 30, 1982, the Film Board distrib-
uted sixty-two films and videotapes in this country.6 In the fall
of 1982, the Registration Unit of the Internal Security Section
of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice ("Regis-
tration Unit") reviewed five of those films, concluding that, be-
cause three of them are "political propaganda," the NFBC must
61. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 303 (1965).
62. Id. at 307.
63. Id.
64. Although the New York office of the NFBC is technically an agent of the
NFBC in Ottawa, Canada, the organization is "crown-owned" and thus operates as a
quasi-governmental entity analogous to the National Endowment for the Arts in this
country. The NFBC is partially funded by the government of Canada but, at least in
theory, enjoys complete artistic freedom.
65. National Film Board of Canada Registration Statement for the six month pe-
riod ending December 31, 1982, cited in Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Au-
thorities in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, at 4,
Block v. Smith, 583 F. Supp. 1283 (D.D.C. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Block Plaintlo'
Memo].
6& Id
67. I&
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comply with FARA's labeling and reporting requirements."
The films, which are clearly marked as Canadian,s examine is-
sues of concern to both United States and Canadian citizens.
The NFBC requested that the Department of Justice recon-
sider its categorization of the films. Pending this reconsidera-
tion, the Justice Department agreed not to impose the section 4
requirements. °
In 1983, two lawsuits were filed by persons who wished to
show the films free of the categorization, labeling and reporting
requirements. In Keene v. Smith,1 California State Senator
Barry Keene, acting as a private citizen, sought a permanent
injunction against FARA's application to the Canadian films
and a declaratory judgment that such application was unconsti-
tutional.72 The plaintiffs in Block v. Smith sought similar re-
lief.73 Mitchell Block, the first named plaintiff in that case, is
68. Id. at 4-5. The two films eventually determined not to be political propaganda
within the meaning of section 1(j) were War Story, a drama based on the experiences
of a Canadian doctor interned in a Japanese P.O.W. camp during World War II, and
Offshore Oil, which examines the impact of oil and technological development on two
coastal towns in Norway and Scotland. Peterson, U.S. Labels Three Films Propa-
ganda, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1983, at Al, col. a. Although these two films do not deal
directly with the American experience, they arguably could work to influence U.S.
viewers with respect to the interests of foreign powers.
69. The films are identified as produced by the National Film Board of Canada in
their introductory titles. They are also marked as NFBC-produced to comply with
United States copyright laws. See 17 U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
70. Joseph E. Clarkson, Chief of the Registration Unit, has indicated that the Jus-
tice Department will not require labeling of the Canadian films. Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 7 n.7, Block v. Smith, 583 F. Supp. 1288 (D.D.C. 1984) [hereinafter cited
as Block Br]. Thus, references in this note to designation of the films as political
propaganda are to categorization of the films rather than to any physical label. See
also supra note 14.
71. 569 F. Supp. 1513 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
72. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Keene v. Smith, 569 F.
Supp. 1513 (E.D. Cal. 1983). Keene was granted a preliminary injunction In Septem-
ber 1983. The Department of Justice filed notice that it would appeal directly to the
U.S. Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982). This seldom-used rule allows di-
rect appeal to that Court when a lower court holds an act of Congress unconstitu-
tional In a case in which an officer of the U.S., acting in his official capacity, is a party.
The Justice Department chose not to act on its initial filing and did not appeal the
preliminary injunction. If Senator Keene wins his case in the California District
Court, however, the government is likely to seek direct review in the U.S. Supreme
Court. Interview with John G. Donhoff, Attorney for Barry Keene (Nov. 19, 1983).
Oral argument for a permanent injunction was heard August 8, 1984. The court took
the arguments on submission. See the addendum to this article for a discussion of the
court's decision.
73. The Block complaint was dismissed for lack of standing. 583 F. Supp. 1288
(D.D.C. 1984). Oral argument on appeal was heard February 12, 1985. No. 84-5318
(D.C. Cir., argued Feb. 12, 1985).
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the United States distributor of If You Love This Planet.74 De-
fendants in both cases were then Attorney General William
French Smith and Joseph E. Clarkson, Chief of the Registra-
tion Unit.
Plaintiffs in both cases claimed that using the term "political
propaganda" to categorize the films is inherently pejorative,
denigrates the films," and stigmatizes those who show them by
implying that they are disseminators of distorted information
calculated to further the goals of a foreign power.76 They con-
tended that this pejorative categorization unfairly associates
them with persons who actually intend to deceive the public.7
Vilification of the films, they argued, prevents those who would
distribute, exhibit and view the films from freely exercising
their rights of free speech and free association, 8 and burdens
those who wish to engage in public debate on important na-
tional and international policy issues." Persons who receive
films from distributors regulated under the Act are also bur-
dened if forced to take affirmative steps to disclaim or counter-
act the negative associations triggered by the films'
classification.80 Deterring persons from receiving information
or denigrating the contents of a communication are paradig-
matic violations of first amendment freedoms.81
74. Block is president of Direct Cinema, Ltd. Biograph, another of the Block
plaintiffs, owns a theater in which the films have been shown. The remaining plain-
tiffs are the State of New York, Environmental Defense Fund, Environmental Task
Force and the New York Library Association, all of which wish to receive and exhibit
the films or have already done so.
75. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, at 7, Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513 (E.D. Cal. 1983) [hereinafter cited
as Keene PlainWs Memo].
76. See id. at 5-7; Block Plaintffr' Memo, supra note 65, at 26.
77. See Keene Plainfffs8 Memo, supra note 75, at 5-8.
78. See L. TRmE, supra note 54, at §§ 12-8 and 12-13 for a discussion of the first
amendment rights of free speech and freedom of association.
79. See i& at § 12-3 - 12-5. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 4-11 (1968) for a discussion of the importance of free speech to a
self-governing society, to individual self-fulfillment and to the attainment of truth.
80. Keene Plaintffs Memo, sup a note 75, at 20. See 8upr text accompanying
notes 60-63 for a discussion of Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), in
which the Court found that inhibiting access to information injures recipients or
would-be recipients of a communication. In addition, those who receive 100 or more
copies of a film must be listed in the "dissemination report" required under § 4(a). 22
U.S.C. § 614(a) (1982). Thus, they may be inhibited in choosing which films to
distribute.
81. See, eg, Procunler v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 415-16 (1914) (prison mail rules
impeded delivery and violated senders' rights); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427
U S, 50, 78 (1976) (Powell, J, concurring) (zoning ordinance that deters would-be au-
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The Block plaintiffs emphasized that the government ex-
ceeded its statutory authority in applying FARA to the Cana-
dian films. FARA was intended to regulate subversive
materials only, they asserted, and these films do not fall within
the section 1(j) meaning of "political propaganda-"' 2 Keene's
analysis, however, was not so dependent on Congressional in-
tent.83 Even if not originally intended to inhibit speech, he ar-
gued, the term "political propaganda" is unquestionably
derogatory today and taints any communication to which it is
applied. Laws which inhibit speech must be given strict scru-
tiny, and no compelling government interest justifies this cate-
gorization." Thus, plaintiffs in both cases asserted that FARA
works to chill basic first amendment rights.85
dience violates its rights); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 US. 241, 256-
58 (1974) (government required right to reply to editorial violates first amendment).
82. Block is clear to point out that "[rlegardless of what Congress intended, plain-
tiffs are injured if the designation is likely to denigrate the films and deter access to
them." Block Brief, supra note 70, at 3. The statutory construction argument may be
viewed in two ways. First, plaintiffs can argue that § 1(j) is ambiguous and must be
interpreted by the court, emphasizing that there can be no reason for the FARA
scheme if it is not in fact derogatory. Or, assuming no ambiguity in § l(j), the plain-
tiffs can argue that there is no legal reason for using the derogatory term "political
propaganda" in § 1(j). Telephone interview with John G. Donhoff, attorney for Barry
Keene (Oct. 31, 1984).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 22-46.
84. See L. TRmE, supra note 54 at § 12-8. See also First Natl Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (state imposed restrictions on speech demand exacting scrutiny);
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843-44 (1978) (Judicial func-
tion to scrutinize legislative actions affecting speech); United States v. Carolene
Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 n.4 (1938) (restrictions on Bill of Rights receive exacting
scrutiny). Some forms of regulation that are non-intrusive and that do not amount to
prior restraint can apply to some forms of speech. Restrictions on the time, place, and
manner of speech are often allowed. But see L. TRIE, supra note 54 at § 123, ex-
plaining that the government may not try to control speech by invoking the "permis-
sive talisman" of time, place or manner. Keene relies in large part on Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) and Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Lamont Court did not question the
derogatory implications of the term used by the Post Office, stating that "[any [per-
son] is likely to feel some inhibition in sending for literature which federal officials
have condemned as 'communist political propaganda."' 381 U.S. at 402; see supra text
accompanying notes 60-63. In Virginia Pharmacy, a consumers' group sued to invali-
date a statute which regulated pharmacists because the regulatory scheme inhibited
the consumers' right to receive information. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 753-56.
Although the Keene court found that Keene had suffered a "distinct and palpable"
injury and thus had standing to sue under Warth v. Seldin, 422 US. 490 (1975), Keene
is not within the ambit of FARA because he is a recipient of the films rather than a
distributor. See Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. at 1518.
85. Keene Plaintiffa Memo, nspra note 75, at 12, Block Plaint ffs' Memo, upra
note 65, at 22-23. First amendment scholar Laurence H. Tribe agreed: "Censorship
can include requiring that something be added. It is the right of the listener to hear
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In both cases, the Justice Department argued that FARA
furthers a compelling national security interest by promoting a
free marketplace of ideas.se Requiring disclosure of identifying
information, it claimed, guarantees that the marketplace will
not be subverted." FARA is purely a disclosure statute, the
government argued, and the Supreme Court has found disclo-
the uncensored content of what people have to say." N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1983, at 16,
col. 5. Any unjustified burdening of the right to communicate or to receive a commu-
nication chills first amendment guarantees and is thus unconstitutional. See L. TRIBE,
aupra note 54, at § 12-8. The government may interfere with basic first amendment
freedoms only to protect a vital national interest. I& Conditioning unburdened re-
ceipt of materials on their contents without such justification is unconstitutional
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786 (speech may be restricted only if justifica-
tion compelling); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (burden on government to
show valid justification for restricting speech); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)
(restriction on speech must be narrowly drawn). See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931) (invalidating injunction against libelous publication); Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938) (invalidating licensing system for distribution of literature as applied
to pamphlets and leaflets); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (registration system
for public speakers invalidated); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963)
(informal state commission approval of books found invalid); Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51 (1965) (procedure for prior review and censorship of films lacked adequate
safeguards). The first amendment protects the right to receive information. Virginia
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1965). The right to speak freely means little if a speaker's intended audience is not
free to receive the communication; interference with reception is an injury separate
from interference with the right to speak. "The dissemination of ideas can accomplish
nothing if otherwise willing [recipients] are not free to receive and consider them. It
would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers." Lamont,
381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring). Significantly, the rights to distribute, ex-
hibit and view a film or videotape are related in a different way than are the rights
that attach to print media, because films are almost always meant to be viewed by
groups of people. Keene Plaintff Memo, supra note 75, at 13-14. Any burdening of
would-be exhibitors' rights to receive a film from a distributor prevents them from
"speaking" by showing the film freely to others. Restraining receipt and exhibition of
films thus interferes with the right to associate freely with others who wish to view
and to discuss the films. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (handbill
ordinance requiring identifying information invalidated); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (compelled disclosure of membership lists chills right of associa-
tion). Application of FARA also involves distinct categorizing, labeling and reporting
requirements which may affect distributors, exhibitors and viewers differently. For
example, while the government claims that FARA's requirements do not mandate
that a film ehitor keep any FARA label attached to a film on which it was placed,
an original dustrbutor such as the NFBC cannot show the film without the label See
aupra note 14.
86. See supra note 56 for decisions finding FARA constitutional for national se-
curity reasons.
87. The "marketplace of ideas" argument for freedom of speech posits that the
best test of truth is the power of an idea to gain acceptance in the arena of competing
thoughts. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J, joined by
Brandeis, J., dissenting); see L. TRIBE, eupra note 54, at § 12-1.
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sure statutes to be valid when they serve a compelling govern-
mental interest."
The Justice Department also pointed out that the section 4
labeling requirement does not mandate use of the word "propa-
ganda.' ' s9 Furthermore, even if it did, the word is neutral, not
pejorative.' Propaganda is defined under section 1(j)-for pur-
poses of FARA-to include any "political advocacy materials,"
not just those using techniques intended to deceive the public.91
According to the government, FARA's requirements impose
merely a slight intrusion-one that is harmless to first amend-
ment rights." Non-subversive information may be relayed sim-
ply by taking steps to ensure that the public is aware the
material originates with foreign agents."
In September 1983, Keene was granted a preliminary injunc-
tion in federal court exempting the films from the Act's re-
quirements pendente lite." The court found the section 1(j)
definition of "political propaganda" to be of doubtful constitu-
tionality." The court also found section 1(j) to be vague and
overbroad, interfering with first amendment guarantees in the
particularly sensitive area of political discourse.s The decision
did not rely on previous rulings on FARA's constitutionality
because, despite Justice Department claims to the contrary,
these rulings were held to be irrelevant to a consideration of
88. See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,411-12 (1950)
(requiring labor officials to provide affidavits that they are not Communists is consti-
tutional); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 101-03
(1961) (compelled disclosure of Communist Party membership justified by threat);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463-66 (1958) (compelled disclosure of NAACP
membership not sufficiently justified). Note that decisions validating compelled dis-
closure of Communist Party membership are no longer followed. L TRIBE supra note
54, at 708.
89. See Keene Defendnts' Memo, upra note 59, at 9-10.
90. Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 1, 26-28, Block v. Smith, 583 F. Supp.
1288 (DD.C. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Block Defendnts' Memo].
91. Id. at 3. As suggested by John G. Donhoff, attorney for the Keene plaintiff,
the government has not explained what it means by the term "political advocacy
materials." Interview with John G. Donhoff (Nov. 19, 1983).
92. Block Defedants' Memo, aupr note 90, at 38-43.
93. Subversive materials are regulated under 18 U.S.C. § 2386, see upra note 29,
see also Keene Defendants' Memo, 8upra note 59, at 24.
94. Keene, 569 F. Supp. at 1513.
95. Technically, granting a preliminary injunction indicates that the court held
sufficient doubt regarding the Act's constitutionality to warrant further litigation.
Telephone interview with John G. Donhoff, attorney for Barry Keene (Oct. 31, 1964).
96. Keene, 569 F. Supp. at 1520.
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section 1(j).O The opinion noted that "[n]o court has ever held
that Congress acted Constitutionally when it chose to charac-
terize all material originating from a foreign source and ad-
dressing public issues as propaganda."9s
The court accepted plaintiff's contention that FARA was
meant to describe "pernicious" communications, implicitly
finding the Act's wartime and cold war purpose inapposite to
current films discussing issues of public concern." In addition,
it rejected the argument that branding all materials of foreign
origin as "political propaganda" advances any government in-
terest in assuring that the public can identify the source of
materials it sees because "Congress could easily have imposed
an identification requirement without denigrating the affected
materials."'1° The court also expressed doubt that any interest
the government may have in labeling "advocacy materials" is a
compelling one. 01
The opinion forcefully rejected the government's assertion
that the phrase "political propaganda" is a neutral term of art,
pnderstood by the "ordinary individual" to have a non-pejora-
tive meaning-
[E]ven Congress must ultimately respect the limits of the Eng-
lish language .... This Court therefore harbors some doubt
about the power of Congress to select a term which has a
widely understood negative connotation and to designate it as a
term of art theoretically having no negative connotation. It
may be beyond the power of Congress to determine, for exam-
ple, that all materials addressing public policy issues and
originating from foreign sources shall hereinafter be called
97. Id. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 47-50, aupra, the court mis-
reads FARA to cover only materials produced abroad.
98. Keene, 569 F. Supp. at 1520.
99. See supra note 15.
100. Keene, 569 F. Supp. at 1520, see also supra note 69 and notes 47-51 and accom-
panying text. One might ask whether the Department of Defense labels its films as
propaganda.
101. Keene, 569 F. Supp. at 1520, see also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960)
(handbill ordinance requiring identifying information invalidated); Gibson v. Florida
Legislature Investigative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1963) (investigation of claimed
NAACP-Communist Party link invalidated due to inadequacy of evidence); Rosen v.
Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1251 (9th Cir. 1981) (ordinance requiring advance re-
gistration by Jews for Jesus wishing to exercise first amendment rights at airport
invalidated); U. Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 488 F-2d 1252,1264 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
,ev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (exercise of Senate subpoena power
threatened first amendment rights); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S, 41, 57-58 (1953)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (exacting standards required when congressional investiga-
tion may threaten first amendment guarantees).
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"poison" or "obscenity." There are words which cannot be
stripped [of] their nuance.lea
IV
Neutral Propaganda
The term propaganda is susceptible of so many definitions that
it is hard to make it the subject of a law.-L. Martin""
A. Etymology And Common Usage
Originally a neutral ecclesiastic term referring to a Roman
Catholic group charged with propagating the faith,10' the word
"propaganda" gradually took on a secular political meaning. 05
In 1964, propaganda scholars John B. Whitton and Arthur Lar-
son wrote that "[t]he word 'propaganda' ... has gradually
come to acquire a tainted and unpleasant connotation. It sug-
gests that someone is trying to put something over on us."' 06
Scholar Leonard Doob has stated that "[a]Imost any other
name sounds sweeter to most people."1° According to Doob,
102. Keene, 569 F. Supp. at 1522. The court's analogy misreads FARA to cover only
foreign-produced material. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
103. Martin, supra note 19, at 10.
104. From the Latin Congregatio de propaganda fide, meaning "congregation for
propagating the faith." VIII THm OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIoNARY 1466 (1933).
105. Id. The Oxford English Dictionary traces the word's origins in ecclesiastic his-
tory. It was first used to mean "a committee of Cardinals of the Roman Catholic
Church having the care and oversight of foreign missions, founded in 1622 by Pope
Gregory XV." The first derogatory dictionary definition of the word is found in
Brande's, DICToNARY OF SCIENCE, LITERATURE AND ART (1842), which explained that
"the name propaganda is applied in modern political language as a term of reproach
to secret associations for the spread of opinions and principles which are viewed by
most governments with horror and aversion." The ancients spread propaganda. Kau-
tilya's ARTHASASTRA, circa 300 B.C., an ancient Indian text similar to Machiavelli's
The Prince, teaches that a king should send secret agents into the marketplace to
dispute the merits of the current regime while lauding the benefits of orderly govern-
ment and the divinity of kingship. Always, he cautions, those agents should conclude
that the current ruler is best. B.S. MURTY, PROPAGANDA AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
1 (1968).
106. J.B. WHrrToN & A. LARSON, PROPAGANDA, TOwARDS DAmAmENT IN A WAR
OF WORDS 9 (1964). One federal court faced with the need to define "propaganda" in a
FARA registration case held that determining just what constitutes propaganda is a
subject for expert testimony. United States v. German-American Vocational League,
Inc., 153 F.2d 860, 865 (3d Cir. 1946), cert denied, 328 U.S. 833 (1946) (finding conspir-
acy to violate FARA's registration requirements).
107. L Doo, PuBLic OPinON AND PROPAGANDA 231 (1966). Doob further states
that "[a]n effective way in Anglo.Saxon society to insult, belittle or expose a man is to
call him a propagandist." Id. at 231-32. Doob is Sterling Professor Emeritus of Psy-
chology at Yale University.
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whether information comes to be categorized as propaganda de-
pends upon the political and social philosophies or ideologies
involvecL'0 According to Edwin Newman, Head of the Usage
Panel of the American Heritage Dictionary, "whatever its ori-
gin, propaganda has become a 'dirty word' .... [W]hen some-
thing is labeled propaganda, it should be looked at closely and
with suspicion. Indeed, calling something propaganda amounts,
for all practical purposes, to saying that it is not worth consid-
ering, that it is to be dismlssed."' °9 Propaganda scholar L. John
Martin examined twenty-six modern definitions of the word,
finding that all were in accord in stating propaganda to be "the
art of influencing, manipulating, controlling, promoting, chang-
ing, inducing, or securing the acceptance of opinions, attitudes,
action or behavior."110 Clearly, any attempt to trace and argue
various possible connotations of the word today is academic;
common usage tells us that the term is derogatory.na
B. The Government's Definition: A Neutral Term of Art
'When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scorn-
ful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more
nor less."
'The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words
mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be
master-that's all."--Lewls Carroll"
The government claims that, as defined in the Act, the term
"political propaganda" is a neutral term of art,n and that sec-
tion 1(j) is meant to define "propaganda" for purposes of FARA
only.114 If the term is broadly construed, it asserts,115 a reader
108. Id. at 231-32.
109. Block Plaint%' Memo, supm note 65, at 27-28 n***.
110. Martin, supra note 19, at 12.
111. One might ask disingenuously whether when one hears the word propaganda
one thinks of a committee of 17th-century cardinals committed to spreading the faith
(see eupro note 105) or, rather, of something deceptive and biased.
112. L CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALacE: AuCES ADVENTUS i WONDERLAND
AND THROUGH THE LOKIN GLAss 269 (Gardner ed. 1960), cited in Keene, 569 F.
Supp. at 1522.
113. By implication, the government considers the term "foreign political propa-
ganda" to be a neutral term of art.
114. See Block Dtfendano' Memo, aupra note 90, at 1-3, 40-42. Extending this logic,
if Congress had chosen to describe materials regulated under the Act as "subversive,"
it could have defined that word for purposes of FARA to be a neutral term of art.
115. Sid at 3, 26-28, 8. The government pointed to United States v. Kelly, 51 F.
Supp 362 (DD.C. 194), a FARA registration case, to support its argument that the
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may reach not only the word's negative connotation, but also
the non-pejorative, non-stigmatizing meaning of "materials
designed to persuade or influence."'u 6 In applying this defini-
tion, the government makes no judgment regarding the truth
or value of materials. 7 FARA is purely a disclosure statute
aimed at educating the public as to the source of the communi.
cations it receives."5 Thomas P. DeCair, Director of the Justice
Department's Office of Public Affairs, suggested that the sec-
tion 4 label is "not unlike the disclosures.. required on al-
most all political advertisements and commercials, or on
packages sold in supermarkets.' '
The government argued that-
the federal judiciary [does not sit] as some sort of ultimate
committee of lexicographical revision to ensure the linguistic
purity of statutory language, and should [not] ... set aside
congressional enactments based upon no more than the often
transient "connotation" that a particular phrase may have in
the public's mind.' °
The Department of Justice admonished the Keene and Block
plaintiffs not to imagine that the public would elect to ignore a
statutory definition and would instead choose to rely on a "vis-
ceral negative connotation.'1'1  The government argued that:
a judgment by the public to be less receptive to foreign advo-
cacy is a valid exercise of the public's right to formulate opin-
ions and judgments about materials to which it is exposed; such
reasoned judgments are precisely the purpose of the FARA.
[A]rmed with full disclosure, the public will make reasoned
term "propaganda" is to be broadly construed. Id. at 29-35. The Kelly court found
that FARA is concerned not only with disclosing the source of materials that advocate
subversive activity, but also with identifying those distributed "at the instance of, and
particularly when pursuant to compensation paid, by [foreign interests], whether
friendly or unfriendly, whether violent or mild." Kelly, 51 F. Supp. at 363. The Jus-
tice Department's reliance is, however, misplaced. The Kelly ruling was specific to
those allegations made in a FARA registration case. Rather than speaking to the na-
ture of the term "propaganda," the court in that case merely restated the Act's pur-
pose in determining to whom the section 4 registration requirements apply.
116. Block Defendants' Memo, supra note 90, at 17 n., 13-18.
117. Id. at 26-29.
118. Id. at 4041; Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Reply to
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 7-8, Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513 (E.D. Cal.
1983), [hereinafter cited as Keene Dendants' Reply].
119. DeCair, supra note 14, at col 6.
120. Block Defendants' Memo, supra note 90, at 2.
121. Block Defendants'Memo, supr note 90, at 17 no.
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judgments based on all information to which it is exposed.m
Moreover, even if the public held erroneous biases regarding
the term "propaganda," the Department of Justice denied that
these biases could be attributed to the government's applying
FARA to particular materials.2 The government also opined
that the films' would-be exhibitors could avoid any perceived
stigma by choosing not to show the materials.12'
In granting Keene a preliminary injunction, the Keene court
recognized the logical inconsistencies in the government's
claim. The court specifically found that FARA's legislative his-
tory shows that the term "political propaganda" was intended
to denigrate materials to which it is applied:
Congress defined "political propaganda" broadly, not because
it was casting about for a neutral term to describe material ap-
propriately labeled, but because it was determined to prevent
any pernicious publications from escaping the statutory net
.... Congress was trying to describe clearly and comprehen-
sively that which it perceived to constitute a threat to the pol-
ity, and it used terms which it understood to convey that
perception. Congress was acting artlessly when it defined the
term "epolitical propaganda."'
Congress could easily have enacted a statute requiring only
that films dealing with political subjects be identified by coun-
try of origin. This approach would have avoided any risk of
denigrating the affected materials.2 e Moreover, if FARA is
merely a disclosure statute that identifies materials on topics of
interest to foreign powers, all five NFBC films submitted to the
Registration Unit in the fall of 1982 arguably should have been
122. Block Defendants' Memo, supra note 90, at 16-17, 17 n.*. The government
clearly intends to argue that the public may conclude that materials distributed by
registered foreign agents are more suspect than those distributed by non-agents. See
supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
.123. Id. at 18 (emphass added). This argument seems disingenuous, designed to
circumvent standing for the Block plaintiffs rather than to be taken at face value. For
a discussion of the standing issue in Block v. Smith, see Block Plaintff' Memo, upra
note 65, at 43-45; Block Defendants' Memo, supra note 90, at 3-23. The government
acknowledges that "due in part to [its] evaluation of the materials, some portion of the
public may form a negative opinion about the materials and about third parties who
choose to promote the materials in the United States," but claims it describes materi-
als as "Propaganda" in pursuit of a valid national security interest in disclosure of the
source of "foreign advocacy" materials. Keene Defe-nants' Reply, supm note 118 at1-2.
124. Keene Defendants' Memo, supra note 59, at 14.
l. Keene, 569 F. Supp. at 1522.
12L See Id. at 1520.
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deemed to fall within section 1(j). '= Furthermore, it would be
paradoxical to choose a harmless term to describe speech from
which citizens must be protected. The government cannot ade-
quately explain how these "harmless," "neutrally character-
ized" communications differ from similar or identical materials
distributed by persons exempt from FARA's registration re-
quirements,u s or from similar or identical materials produced
in the United States.= Congress would not have acted to affect
benign communications.
The government also argued that FARA's categorization and
labeling requirements should be upheld because any publicly
perceived bias toward the affected films would not be the result
of FARA's application but, rather, of public misapprehension of
the term "propaganda.'" That argument flies in the face of
first amendment theory. It suggests-incorrectly-that, to be
found invalid, a statute not only must inhibit speech, but also
must be intended to do so.m The Keene court specifically de-
termined that "it is ... erkforcement of the statute which is the
cause of [Keene's] injury."=82
The government's argument that the films' would-be exhibi-
tors may avoid any perceived stigma by choosing not to air the
materials also turns the first amendment on its head.'=2 The
first amendment guarantees that a citizen's choice to speak or
not to speak will be freely made.' The Keene plaintiff argued
forcefully that the government may not ask speakers to refrain
from exercising their rights:
Under the guise of encouraging "free and open debate" defend-
ants decide to use the power and influence of the federal gov-
ernment to undercut the arguments of their domestic political
opponents on matters of grave national importance. The de-
fendants may wish to attempt to sway the public by pointing to
the foreign source of the films plaintiff may use in debate.
127. See supra note 68
128. See supra note 36.
129. The government has consistently assumed, incorrectly, that FARA applies
only to foreign-produced materials. See supra notes 47-51.
130. See Block Dfendan9s' Memo, supm note 90, at 18.
13L See L TRmBE, aupra note 54, at § 12-20, see also iqfm note 142.
132. Keene, 569 F. Supp. at 1518 (emphasis added).
133. See Keene Defendants' Memo, supra note 59, at 14.
134. See L TmE, supra note 54, at § 12-8. This argument was suggested in Memo-
randum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and in Reply to Defendants'
Answer to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10, Keene v. Smith, 569 F.
Supp. 1513 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
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They are free to attempt to make such a case. The First
Amendment prohibits, however, those same opponents from
using the neutral machinery of government to characterize a
film as untrustworthy, even subversive, and then, in effect, to
dare plaintiff or anyione else to use at his own risk. That is not
debate. That is abuse of power.
V
Strict Scrutiny
Self-governing citizens cannot undertake their democratic re-
sponsibilites where the government rigs the marketplace of
ideas by forcefully discounting particular messages.-The
Block plaintiffs.1Ms
FARA is content-sensitive because it focuses on communica-
tions about specific public policy issues."' Speech about issues
of public concern is afforded the highest order of protection by
the first amendment.m If challenged, a content-sensitive law
that impinges on first amendment rights must be given strict
scrutiny.L To withstand challenge, the law must be narrowly
drawn to further a compelling state interest.14° Thus, in deter-
minin whether the inhibiting effects that plaintiffs claim re-"
sult from categorizing the Canadian films are constitutionally
permissible, the Keene and Block courts must balance the ne-
cessity for the specific "political propaganda" designation
against the law's impact on first amendment freedoms.14 That
an inhibitory effect on expression is unintended is no
135. Id.
136. Block Pahnt(ffi' Memo, supr note 65, at 30. See also Attorney General v.
Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d at 928, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wald, J., and Bazelon, J.,
concurring).
137. Keene, 569 F. Supp. at 1520. -.
1M8 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US. 1, 14 (1976) (political expression given broadest pro-
tection); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 US. 23, 32 (1968) (competing ideas and policies at
core of first amendment); Mils v. Alabama, 384 U& 214, 21-19 (1966) (first amend
ment protects discussion about government); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U& 254, 270 (1964) (profound national commitment to uninhibited debate on public
issues); Garrison v. L4uisana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (speech concerning public af-
fairs is essence of self-government).
139. See L TRME, upm note 54, at § 12-& See also, ag., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U .
at 5, irst Natl Bank v. Bellottl, 4S5 US. at 783; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 US. 530, 540 (1980).
140. SeeL TLn, sup note 54, at § 12-. See also, ag, First Natl Bank v. Bel-
lottI, 435 UA at 786; Elrod v. Burns, 427 US. at 362; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. at 25;
Kusper v. Pontlku 414 U. 51, 59 (1973).
141. See L. TM , upm note 54, at 584.
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The Attorney General claimed that, on balance, a film's cate-
gorization under FARA is but a negligible intrusion into the
first amendment freedoms that protect our foreign relations
and national defense interests.4 8 At the same time, however,
the government cites with approval the 1943 Supreme Court
decision in Vierecc v. United States,'" which held that
FARA's disclosure requirements enhance free speech.1 45 This
position is inconsistent. Generally, when the government
claims that "national security" justifies restricting speech, it is
referring to the nation's political security against foreign, anti-
United States interests.4 In contrast, the government here
contends that this country's foreign relations and defense inter-
ests are best served by restricting speech to promote a free mar-
ketplace of ideas in the United States.147 Thus, a true
142. See, eg., Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 US. 575
(1993) (use tax unconstitutionally singles out press); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 59-64 (1963) (book categorizing scheme unconstitutional); Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 US. 421, 427-3 (1969) (labor commissioner's accusatory function de-
prived investigatee of rights); National Black United Fund, Inc. v. Devine, 667 F.2d
173, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("rule that substantially impairs the ability of certain groups
to convey their message to a desired audience... effectively 'abridges speech' even if
it is not intended to curtail public debate").
143. See Block Defendants' Memo, supra note 90, at 42; Keene Defendants' Memo,
supra note 59, at 21. Defendants argued that this policy is furthered by requiring
public disclosure of the identity of persons promoting foreign interests through the
U.S. mass media. Block Defendants' Memo, supra note 90, at 42; Keene Defendants'
Memo, supra note 59, at 21.
144. 318 U.S. 236. See text accompanying notes 57-59.
145. See Keene Defendants' Memo, uprm note 59, at 19-20.
146. See generally New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the Pen-
tagon Papers Case) (prior restraint of expression bears heavy presumption of
unconstitutionality).
147. See Block Defendants' Memo, upum note 90, at 42, citing K.R. REP. No. 1470,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 2397, 2398; see
also Keene Defendants' Memo, aupra note 59, at 16; see also supra notes 57, 59, 87, and
accompanying text. The free marketplace of ideas envisioned in numerous judicial
interpretations of the first amendment since Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919), is the "free and open debate" of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255
(1964). But see M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNmENT SPEAKS-POLmTCS, LAW, AND Gov-
KENMENT ExPRESSION IN AMERICA 90-93 (1983). According to the first amendment
analysis suggested by Mark G. Yudof, the government speaks when it pulls the strings
in the marketplace of ideas thereby influencing communication. Id. at 90. Rather
than promoting some idealized free marketplace, application of FARA to the Cana-
dian films promotes a communications marketplace that, like any other market, "ap-
pears to many to be an illusion of the liberal state, dependent upon a blind faith in
equality and a hazy ontology obfuscating the real world proesses of persuasion and
domination." Id. at 92. See also T. EMRSON, THE SyiEm OF FREEDOM OF ExPu-.
SION 699-700 (1970).
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marketplace of ideas--one that includes subversive communi-
cationse"-is contrary to the government's view of national se-
curity. The history of the Act indicates that, in fact, Congress
meant to protect the first amendment by exposing subversive
and covert activities undertaken in furtherance of foreign in-
terests.1 FARA, however, is not well designed to promote
freedom of discourse.
Whatever the merits of the government's national security
concerns,15° its proferred justification for inhibiting speech has
nothing to do with the issue central to Keene and Block.151 It is'
not enough to claim that FARA as a whole serves a valid na-
tional security function. For the Act to survive strict scrutiny,
the government must specifically justify its use of the offending
section 1(j) definition.m The Justice Department has given no
reason why it must categorize regulated materials as "political
propaganda." Furthermore, the Act is by no means the least
drastic means of ensuring that the films be dearly identified.'
VI
Vagueness and Overbreadth
On its face, section 1 could cover almost any documentary
which discusses the affairs of the day.-M. Schwartz'
Even if the government were able to justify use of the section
1(j) definition by balancing its restrictive effect on speech
against a compelling interest in the section 1(j) language,
FARA is vague and overbroad.1 As described by the Justice
Department, section 1(j)'s definition is sufficiently broad to in-
14& See upma note 87.
149. See aupm text accompanying note 15; see also 8upr notes 28 and 34.
150. See Keene, 569 F. Supp. at 1520 n.3. As Justice Black stated in New York
Times v. United States (the Pentagon Papers Case), "[the] word security is a broad,
vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental
law embodied in the first amendment." 403 U&. at 719.
15L This argument was suggested by John G. Donhoff, attorney for Barry Keene.
Telephone Interview with John G. Donhoff (Oct. 31, 1984).
152. See L. TRiE, upra note 54, at § 12-8. See also infra text accompanying notes
155-19.
153. See aupm note 69 and text accompanying note 100. If Keene or Block reaches
the U. Supreme Court, it seems likely that the Court will construct a balancing test
through which the constitutionality of the Act as a whole will be affirmed.
154. Schwartz & Paul, supra note 2, at 633.
155. Courts need not reach the vagueness and overbreadth issues unless the gov-
ernment is able to show that FARA is narrowly drawn to further a compelling state
interesL See eupra note 101, Elrod v. Burms, 427 UJ. at 36 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 Ua
at 25, Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 US. at 59 (1973).
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elude "a film about a country that boasts good seaports and low
taxes."'  Although offered in support of the government's
claim that FARA's propaganda designation is a neutral label,
this statement reveals section 1(j)'s fatal flaw. Section 1(j) ren-
ders the Act unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because
the statute may be arbitrarily enforced.
The Supreme Court has ruled re eatedly that a regulatory
statute that includes within its ambit constitutionally protected
speech is impermissibly overbroad.1w In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma,m the Court indicated that "substantial" over-
breadth must be found to invalidate a law by invoking the over-
breadth doctrine.u Because section 1(j)'s definition of
propaganda is fundamental to application of FARA, and be-
cause its inprecise wording is broad enough to include "purely
... issue discussion," 1e° there is support for the argument that
FARA meets the Broadrick standard.6
Section 1(j) may be read so broadly as to apply to any materi-
als which might persuade162 A law is impermissibly vague if
"men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning."'
156. Peterson, aupu note 68.
157. L TRIBE, 8upru note 54 at §§ 12-24 see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296,311 (1940) (statute regulating soliciting of funds); Kunz v. New York, 403 U.S. 290,
295 (1951) (standardless licensing system for religious meetings); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (state bar law regardiqg segregation litigation); NAACP v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964) (compelled dsclosure of associates); Keyishlan v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) (loyalty oath); Lewis v. City of New Orle-
ans, 415 U.S. 130, 134 (1974) (opprobrious language).
158. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
159. Id. at 613 (overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine"); see also Village of Hoff-
man Estates v. Flipslde, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (pre-enforcement challenge to ordinance
rejected).
160. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 79 (provisions of federal election law unconstitu-
tionally vague because pure issue discussion could be reached).
161. Section 1(J)'s imprecise definition means that the Act may be arbitrarily en-
forced under § 4. See also aupm, note 18.
162. Congress could not have intended that FARA regulate all political speech be-
cause the Act applies only to spech by those who must register as foreign agents. 22
U.S.C. § 614(a). It is also impossible that Congress intended to regulate all speech by
such agents, because § 3 exempts some communications. See supra note 36.
163. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 US. 610, 620 (1976) (quoting Comnally v. Gen-
eral Contractors Co., 269 U.S. 385,391 (1926) (ordinance requiring "identification" in-
validated)). As Justice Marshall reminded us in Grayned v. City of Rockford,
however, we are "[clondemned to the use of words [and]... can never expect mathe-
matical certainty from our language." 408 U.S 104, 110 (1972) (unti-noise ordinance
not vague). Thus imprecise language must sometimes be tolerated if what the law
says as a whole is clear "when measured by common undefta"ng and practie"
Miller v. California, 413 U.S 15, 27 n.10 (1973) (emphasis added) (citing United States
v. Petrillo, 332 U., 1, 7-8) (definin obscenity). But see United States v. Harris, 347
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Two primary justifications are given for the "void-for-vague-
ness" doctrine.'" First, a statute must let citizens know how
they must behave in order to conform to the law.les Second, a
criminal statute such as FARA must provide objective enforce-
ment criteria to avoid a "standardless sweep [that would allow
those charged with enforcement] to pursue their personal
predilections. ' 'lss
Determinations as to whether communications are "propa-
ganda" are made by career attorneys in the Justice Depart-
ment's Registration Unit. The Department claims that its
functionaries are qualified to determine what constitutes
"propaganda," "based primarily on common sense. " le Neither
the Act nor its implementing regulations provide Registration
Unit employees with guidelines beyond the section 1(j)
definition.
Whether section 1(j) covers a particular communication is
unclear, as evidenced by the controversy surrounding the defi-
nition of the term "political propaganda ' 'ls As the Block
plaintiffs explain, "[a]n agent is at sea in determining whether
U.S. 612, 624 n.15 (1954) (upholding registration of lobbyists and their funding
sources). See also Red ion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, in which the Court noted that
the regulatory language used was as precise as possible given the complicated circum-
stances involved, and upheld subjective statutory criteria for determining fairness.
381 F.2d 908, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1967), affd 395 US. 367 (1967).
164. For a recent synopsis of void-for-vagueness analysis see Big Mama Rag, Inc. v.
United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding the word "educational"
unconstitutionally vague).
165. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1974) (no standards specified); Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108.
166. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353-54 (1983) (statute requiring "credible
and reliable" identification allowed police too much discretion); Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965) (grounds for denying protest march permit un-
constitutionally vague); Smith v. Goguen, 425 U.S. at 575. The words "recognized
charitable cause," (Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. at 621); "contemptuously,"
(Smith v. Goguen, 415 US. at 566); "treasonable or seditious," (Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. at 597-99); and "good character' (Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S
147, 163-84 (1939)) are examples of terms which have been found to be unconstitu.
tionally vague in a first amendment context.
167. Thomas P. DeCeir, Director of the Justice Department's Office of Public Af-
fairs, defended the Department's reliance on this "I know it when I see it" standard.
Peterson, Canada AMia State Department to Reverse Decison on T7hrw Films, Wash.
Post, Feb. 26, 1983, at A2, col. L
166. The language reads in pertinent part: "Expression by any person... reason-
ably adapted... to influence a recipient." 22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (1982). The words "influ-
ence" and "interests" are also particularly malleable; the word "political" is equally
subject to debate as to Its meaning. The corollary to the uncertainty surrounding
FARA's application is the uncertainty created by possible misapprehension of its al-
legedly neutral connotation See supra text accompanying notes 112-123
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his speech 'influences' public opinion in the United States re-
garding the 'public interests' of his principal or whether the
Justice Department might think so."'16
In NAACP v. Button, 70 Justice Brennan emphasized that
"[t]he objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does
not depend upon absence of fair notie ... or upon unchan-
neled delegation of legislative powers, but upon the danger of
tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the exist-
ence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper
application.' n FARA is such a statute.
VII
Statutory Interpretation of FARA
Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition.-Learned
Hand7 2
The goal of statutory interpretation is to determine Congres-
sional intent.73 According to the canons of statutory construc-
tion, statutory interpretation should begin with the words used
in the statute, I74 read in a manner consistent with its defini-
tional sections.' 5 If a statutory definition is unambiguous, and
neither leads to an absurd result nor frustrates legislative in-
tent, a court generally should not look beyond its plain mean-
ing ' In such a case, one should not resort to legislative
history or to other forms of statutory exegesis.'7 If a definition
169. Block Plaintlffk'Memo, supra note 65, at 42.
170. 371 U.. 415 (1963).
171. l at 433 (statute regulating NAACP's litigation activities invalidated).
172. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Clr. 1941).
173. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975).
174. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980) (construing § 6(b)(1) of the Consumer Product Safety Act); Burns v. Alcala, 420
U.S. 575, 58041 (1975) (construing § 406(a) of the Social Security Act).
175. C. SANDS, supra note 46, at § 47.07.
176. Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (1978) (construing § 15(7)
of the Interstate Commerce Act). When statutory language is ambiguous, a court
must examine congressional intent to determine how to construe the legislation. See,
e.g., Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 US. 1, 9-10 (1976) (constru-
ing the Atomic Energy Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act); Heppner v.
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 665 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1981).
177. [W]here the words of a law... have a plain and obvious meaning, all
construction, in hostility with such meaning, is excluded. This is a maxim of
law, and a dictate of common sense; for were a different rule to be admitted,
no man, however cautious and intelligent, could safely estimate the extent of
his engagements, or rest upon his own understanding of a law until a Judicial
construction... had been obtained.
[V l. 7
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
could be interpreted so as to give a statute a lawful or unlawful
meaning, it should be interpreted so as to preserve the statute's
validity.17 8
The government pointed to these canons in support of its
contention that section 1(j) is constitutional as applied to the
Canadian films. It claimed that because "any reference to ma-
nipulative, objectionable, misleading or false information" is
"[c]onspicuously absent from the FARA's definition of 'political
propaganda'... it is patently clear that on its face the statute
does not characterize advocacy materials [derogatorily]."'1
The court, the government contended, "should not declare a
statute which is otherwise valid unconstitutional simply be-
cause some persons may give a word an improper
construction. ' 'lso
This argument has merit to the extent that a statutory defini-
tion usually is conclusive,181L "even though [it] does not coincide
with the ordinary meaning of the words used. '' s Legal com-
mentators caution, however, that this principle is true only "so
long as the prescribed meaning is not so discordant to common
usage as to generate c"fusion"s ,,f... definitions are arbi-
trary and result in unreasonable classifications or are uncer-
tain, then the court is not bound by the definition.8 4
"Definitions ... may be determinable only through further
practice of the methods of interpretation.' ' 8s5 Moreover, a court
may inquire into the contextual meaning of statutory words
when there has been a change in circumstances since enact-
ment or when a literal interpretation would be unreasonable:'N
Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 1, 89-90 (1823). See Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate
Cases, 436 U.S. at 643; Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965) (construing
§ 1222(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954).
178. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 US. at 108 (1980).
179. Block Dtfendants' Memo, supra note 90, at 43. See also aupmu note 91.
180. Block Defendants' Memo, supra note 90, at 43.
181. C. SANDs, supm note 46, at § 47.07. See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S 379
(1979) (construing § 5(a) of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act); Consumers
Union of the United States, Inc. v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (bank
records exempt from the Freedom of Information Act).
182. C. SAMDs, supra note 46, at § 20.08.
183. Id. at § 47.07 (emphasis added). See also id at §§ 20.08, 27.02.
184. Id. at § 20.08 (emphasis added).
185. Id. at § 47.07.
186. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co, 383 U.S. 392 (1966) (construing § 14(c)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Act); United States v. American Trucking As'n, 310 U.S 534 543 (1940)
(construing §§ 204(a)(1), (2) of the Federal Motor Carrier Act); Consumers Union of
the United States v. Heimann, 589 F.2d at 534.
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Where definitions ... produce meanings that are too
skewed or applications that are too improbable in comparison
to natural and ordinary meanings and applications, constitu-
tional problems may doubtless be encountered .... When a
statute defines a word to mean something wholly different
from what it means in conventional usage... its constitution-
ality may be subject to question..... This is in recognition
that queer or fanciful definitions may be deceptive and mis-
leading to the ordinary reader because conventional meanings
generally tend to crowd artificial meanings from memory.UA
The government's argument that a court should not look be-
yond the allegedly facially-neutral section 1(j) is premised on a
lack of ambiguity in the statutory language. Yet the govern-
ment itself felt it necessary to examine FARA's history in argu-
ing that the 1(j) language is a neutral term of art.'
The various possible applications of the section 1(j) definition
are evidence of the ambiguity of the term "propaganda" as it is
used in the Act, and of the uncertainty of legislative intent re-
garding FARA's coverage.ss It is unclear whether Congress'
failure to reword section 1(j) when it reworked the law's stated
purpose in 19 66 19° was deliberate or inadvertent."' There is no
pre-1966 judicial interpretation of section 1(j) with which to
compare the current interpretations.
Moreover, because first amendment interests are implicated,
courts should be especially careful not to apply statutory lan-
guage pro forma. 192 In general, courts must construe statutes
narrowly to avoid raising constitutional issues, especially when
first amendment rights are involved.s As the Block plaintiffs
187. C. SANDS, sUpro note 46, at § 27.01.
188. See Block Defendants'Memo, supra note 90, at 28-35.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 28-46.
190. See 8upr- text accompanying notes 42-46.
191. Amending part of a law '%vhich has received contemporaneous and practical
construction may indicate approval of interpretations pertaining to the unchanged
and unaffected parts of the law." C. SANDS, aupnx note 46, at § 49.10 (emphasis ad-
ded). It is impossible to state unequivocally that Congress intentionally retained
§ 1(j) or that it was meant to refer to the same or similar communications both before
and after amendment.
192. This argument was suggested in the Block Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 65, at
19.
193. United States v. Grace, 481 U.S. 171 (1983) (leafletting and picketing on side-
walks surrounding U.S. Supreme Court permitted); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi-
cago 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (construing sections of the National Labor Relations
Act); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958) (construing sections of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952). It would be dangerous, however, for plaintiffs to
depend on the statutory construction argument. It is likely that the Supreme Court
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explained, "(h]owever FARA section 1(j) may apply to other
communication[s], it should not be construed to reach [the
three Canadian] films, which are clearly protected speech, and
far afield from the problems Congress sought to remedy by
FARA."D'*
VIII
Conclusion
Under the first amendment, government restraint of speech
is severely limited.19 Thus, serious constitutional problems
arise if FARA is to be applied to all communications dealing
with controversial poitical issues. Contrary to the govern-
ment's claim, FARA's section 1(j) does not focus on true propa-
gandists"8 but, rather, on political communicationu and
therefore interferes with free expression. Even if FARA
serves a compelling state interest by monitoring certain very
dangerous communications,'" the section 10) definition of
"propaganda" is so expansive and malleable that it renders
FARA invalid for vagueness and overbreadth.1'
Application of the Act to the three Canadian films illustrates
these principles. The origin of these films is easily identifiable
without the FARA label; were it not so clear, a simple '" ade in
Canada" would do.2° The films have been categorized as prop-
aganda merely because they were distributed by an organiza-
would not invalidate FARA's self-defining § 1(J) on that basis, but would instead find
that the rules of statutory construction allow Congress to define a term of art. Tele-
phone interview with John G. Donhoff, attorney for Barry Keene (Oct. 31, 1984).
194. Block Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 65, at 19.
195. See L. TRIBE, 8upu, note 54, at § 12-8; see also 8upm note 85. As the govern-
ment points out, enforcement of FARA is not a prior restraint on speech because the
dissemination reports required under § 4 need not be submitted for 48 hours following
distribution of a communication. 22 U.S.C. § 614(a). See Block Dfendants' Memo,
awpr note 90, at 5.
196. See aupra note 3 for examples of true propagandists. The original FARA was
intended to deal with subversive activities "and for other purpoes." See uupa note &
Congress' failure to use the word "subversive" in the Act and the broad definition
added to FARA in 1942 are evidence of an intent to regulate as much information as
possible. See aupro text accompanying notes 28-4.
197. Any communication by a registered foreign agent is subject to regulation
under sections 1 and 4 of the Act. See eupr note 14.
19& See 8up, text accompanying notes 148-153.
199. See esp, text acompanying notes 154-169.
200. "rhe sponsorship of the films is no more secret than the Pope's religion." '
Film Ratings Rate An 'X" N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1983 at 22, coL L
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tion that is required to register under the Act. °1 The same
films distributed by persons exempt from FARA would be free
of the stigmatizing characterization and label, and of the effects
of the reporting requirement. If they had been distributed by
persons who are required to register but who had not done so, it
is unlikely that those titles would have crossed the desk of the
Justice Department's Internal Security Division. Thus, they
would have escaped the FARA net.
It is logically inconsistent for the government to argue that
"propaganda" is not a derogatory label while simultaneously
claiming that it must implement the statute to protect Ameri-
cans.20 Moreover, the government's claim that it may influ-
ence the marketplace of ideas with FARA directly undermines
basic democratic principles. 08 As Judge Wald explained in At-
torney General of the United States v. Irish People, Inc., a
decision upholding application of FARA's registration require-
ments, "I resist the notion that the power of prosecution may
be used selectively to manage the information put before the
American people in debates over foreign policy." ° Political
speech is to be protected above all, and public discussion of
political issues is burdened when materials are selectively
branded as propaganda.
FARA's definitional language is so contrary to popular un-
derstanding that it defeats the presumption favoring retention
of a statute's internal definition. The "propaganda" classifica-
tion denigrates the films, brands their distributors, deters po-
tential recipients who would receive the information if it had
not been denigrated and causes recipients to be suspicious of
the films' contents. The government's claim that "political
20L See stpra note 11 and accompanying text.
202. See Block Dqfendants'Memo, mspru note 90, at 1-3, 40-42.
203. "If we advert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the
censorial powers in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over
the people." J. MADISON, 4 ANNA.S OF CONGRESS 934 (1793-95).
204. 684 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
205. Id. at 956 (Wald, J., concurring).
206. "[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the es-
sence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). See also
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (political expression given broadest protection);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,32 (1968) (competing ideas and policies at core of first
amendment); Mills v. Alabama 384 U.S. 214, 218-29 (1966) (first amendment protects
discussion about government); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254, 270 (1964)
(profound national commitment to uninhibited debate on public issues).
[Vol. 7
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
propaganda" operates as a neutral term of art seems disingenu-
ous at best, and fatuous at worst.
ADDENDUM
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California issued its opinion in Keene v. Meese " on September
12, 1985, enjoining defendants from enforcing "any portion of
FARA which incorporates the term 'political propaganda' as a
term of art."2° That opinion substantially corrobrates the ra-
tionale for finding that, as suggested in this note, sections 1(j)
and 4 of FARA violate the first amendment.
Holding that the phrase "political propaganda" is "semanti-
cally slanted,"'2° the court found that the question posed was
one of first impression-whether the first amendment limits
Congressional power to choose a denigrating word or phrase as
a statutory term of art.2 10 The court went on to hold that just
as the first amendment prohibits abridging speech which is the
object of a Congressional enactment, it prohibits abridging
speech through the very form of the enactment.m Absent
compelling justification, "an otherwise inflammatory phrase"
may not be used as a "neutral" statutory definition.m2
The court found FARA's section 1(j) definition of "political
propaganda" to be a "relatively unambiguous... construct of
the legislative draftsmen" which, "considered wholly apart
from the conventions of ordinary usage," carries no negative
meaning.218 The Act's legislative history makes it "abundantly
clear," however, that Congress intended to suppress or restrict
speech when it wrote section 1(j). 214 Thus, in selecting the
phrase "political propaganda," Congress chose "not so much to
flount [linguistic conventions] as to exploit them."2' Persons
who disseminate materials officially found to be political propa-
207. No. Civ. S-83-287 RAR, slip op. (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12,1985). Attorney General
Edwin Meese, successor to William French Smith, was substituted by the court as
defendant in the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25.
208. Slip Op. at I H.
209. Id, at 11 B, cting W. & M. MoRRIS HARPER DIcIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY
USAGE 501 (1975).
210. Slip Op. at II.
21L Id at IIE.
21Z Id at C.
213. Id at IB.
214. Id at IIE.
215. Id at H G.
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ganda "rnm... the risk of being held in a negative light by
members of the general public."' 6 Thus, FARA burdens
speech by making regulated materials available only to persons
courageous enough to use materials which have been "[cen-
sured officially] by the government."'*
Since the government showed no justification, "compelling
or otherwise," for use of the phrase "political propaganda," the
term not only renders section 1(j) unconstitutional, but also
'Infect[s]" section 4 of the Act.2 Thus, the court concluded, as
does this note, that sections 1(j) and 4 of FARA violate the first
amendment and are consequently unconstitutional.
2& St n F.
217. Ad
216 id atI n &
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